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Abstract Money laundering regulations have become stricter over time and involve
more and more actors. This means that the accountability of laundering regulation will
become more important; theoretically, money laundering should have decreased with
the implementation of new regulations. However, as this paper shows, it is difficult to
estimate even the sign of the trend in the proceeds of crime and of laundering over time
with particular reference to the drug trade. There seems to be a substitution from hard to
softer drugs, and no substantial decline in the proceeds of crime and likewise no
substantial decline in money laundering. Criminals seem to switch from the more
controlled banking sector into still less controlled parts of financial markets, and from
financial markets to other sectors. These new sectors include electronic payments, trade
and real estate. The paper shows how one can empirically approach the latter two by
using economic information of unusual prices and other characteristics in order to
identify the amount of laundering in these sectors. Combining economic information
with criminological data facilitates the development of a new tool for identifying money
laundering in some important sectors.
Introduction
Money laundering-bringing illicit proceeds from drugs, fraud and other crime, back
into the legal economy-became a crime only in the late 1980s. The originator and
most prominent supporter of this new policy was the United States, which switched
from an unsuccessful anti-drug policy to an anti-money laundering policy [18, 34].
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Many regulatory efforts have been made since to bring this issue onto the
international agenda [32]. Today, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an
intergovernmental body established by the G-7 in 1989, sets the international anti-
money laundering policy standards with which countries have to comply if they do
not want to risk being blacklisted with serious negative economic consequences. The
private sector, mainly the financial sector but progressively also other sectors, is
obliged to apply rules for customer due diligence and to report suspicious activities
or transactions of their (potential) clients to the authorities. Many actors became
involved globally in this new policy field and they have all been confronted with
costs of compliance.
This means that the accountability of money laundering regulation1 will become
more important. Was this anti money laundering policy successful and worth its
money? Could the war on drugs and crime be won by changing it into a war on the
proceeds of crime?
The paper argues that the major effect of anti money laundering policy so far is
substitution that takes place within the financial sector and between sectors.
Financial sector money laundering is substituted by using the still uncontrolled
parts of the financial sector and by finding new forms of laundering in other sectors.
Laundered money seems to move like water, which always finds its way through
stones and other hindrances.
Section “Regulatory Efforts to Reduce Money Laundering and Crime” describes
the regulatory efforts that have been undertaken globally to reduce money
laundering and crime. Section “The Trend in the Proceeds of Crime” discusses the
trend in the proceeds of crime and argues that both drugs and proceeds of crime have
not diminished systematically. So, money must still be laundered somewhere.
Section “New ways of money laundering and some empirical evidence” identifies
new forms of laundering money and ways of measuring them. Specifically, it
discusses the changed role of the financial sector for laundering which might have
induced a substitution of laundered money by using different laundering techniques.
It explores these potential alternative ways of laundering money and shows how one
could empirically measure some of them. The paper concludes with urging better
data in order to prove the substitution effect empirically and warns from wanting to
abandon money laundering completely.
Regulatory efforts to reduce money laundering and crime
Money laundering regulation was mainly the result of a failed US war on drugs,
which under the Clinton regime turned into a fight to reclaim the proceeds of crime.
Drug abuse had been criminalized in the US in 1922 without much effect on drug
production and consumption. If drug dealers and eventually other criminals could
not be identified and prosecuted directly, then at least they should be discouraged by
the realization that they could not reap the monetary benefits of their acts (see [18,
34]). So, in 1986 (Title 18, US Code Sec. 1956), money laundering was criminalized
1 See den Hertog [17] p.35ff for theories of regulation and the trade off between independence and
accountability of regulation.
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in the US with penalties of up to 20 years in prison and $500,000 in fines. Further
legal arrangements were made that permitted seizing, freezing and confiscation of
assets by the authorities.
At a global level, anti-money laundering policy started in the late 1980s with the
UN Convention on Drug and Narcotics of 1988 [39]. As aforementioned, in 1989,
the FATF, an intergovernmental body to combat money laundering, was established
by the G-7 countries. Since then there has been a steady move against money
laundering globally. This increased in the late 1990s and accelerated since the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Getting hold of terrorists by combating the
financing of terrorism became part of the anti-money laundering policy. Today there
are forty anti-money laundering recommendations and nine combating terrorist
financing recommendations published by the FATF, with which countries have to
comply. They face regular mutual evaluations and in case of non-compliance with
the recommendations, they can get blacklisted as non-cooperative countries (see
[35]). The FATF herewith sets the international standards with which countries have
to comply by transferring these standards into national law. They have to adapt their
administration, law enforcement, and execution to combat money laundering and
terrorism. Lawyers in ministries, policemen, public prosecutors, and judges are all
involved in this fight against money laundering. Special organizations, like the
Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), have been established as anti-money laundering
units in each country as a result.
While FATF recommendations are ‘soft’ law and are hence not legally enforceable, in
the European Union parts of them, in particular the reporting of suspicious transactions
by the private sector, have become ‘hard’ law for all 27 EU member countries. The first
EU Directive ‘for the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of
money laundering’ (91/308/EEC) included an identification and a reporting duty of
suspicious financial transactions for financial institutions. The second EU Directive
(2001/97/EC) on money laundering extended the reporting obligation beyond financial
services to other economic sectors. The third and most recent EU Directive on money
laundering (2005/60/EC) broadened the definition of money laundering by including
terrorist financing. By December 2007, EU member states had to introduce plans to
implement ongoing customer due diligence (CDD), identify non-domestic politically
exposed persons (PEPs) and ascertain beneficial ownership of offshore accounts. Banks,
real estate agents, notaries public, and traders in large values are obliged to screen their
clients and to identify persons, activities or transactions suspected of money laundering
or terrorist financing among their clients. The FIU collects their suspicious transaction
reports. Supervisory authorities are involved in ensuring the compliance of banks and
other sectors with the anti money laundering regime. Some countries, like the US, have
high sanctions for not reporting, including a fine as great as $250,000 or 5 years
imprisonment [19].
To sum up, a lot of efforts by the government and consequently also by the
private sector—in particular by the financial sector-have been undertaken to fight
crime through combating the proceeds of crime. Since the inclusion of terrorist
financing into the anti-money laundering laws, anti-money laundering policy has
become an international policy priority. It has developed into a matter of
international safety and security, which means that it overrules most other national
laws. Anti-money laundering policy has turned from fighting Al Capone to fighting
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Al Qaeda (see [34]). The logical question to be raised is whether all these efforts
have had the intended effect.
The trend in the proceeds of crime
Did the proceeds of crime or crime itself go down since the introduction of anti-
money laundering policy in the late 1980s? As the following section will show,
answering this still requires some puzzle work. One must first see which proceeds of
crime are targeted by anti money laundering policy (see “Predicate Offences for
Money Laundering”), then attempt to quantify the volume of these predicate crimes
(2.2) and next find adequate prices to arrive at the proceeds of crime (2.3) which can
be potentially laundered and their development over time, in order to find out
whether money laundering has truly declined (2.4). As will become clear, section
“The Proceeds of Crime” will focus mostly on data on drug trafficking to determine
trends in the proceeds of crime. Section “Money Laundering” explores other ways to
approach money laundering in a broader sense.
Predicate offences for money laundering
Defining money laundering relates to the so-called ‘predicate offences’, which
generate the proceeds that make laundering necessary. Hiding or disguising the
source of certain proceeds will of course, not amount to money laundering unless
these proceeds were obtained from criminal activity [7]. The United States has
developed a 130+ list of predicate crimes for money laundering.
Originally, mainly crimes with regard to drugs were included on the list;
eventually fraud, counterfeiting, fencing, and illegal work were added and after 09/
11 terrorist financing was added as well.
To what extent tax evasion is part of money laundering is still an unresolved issue
in this debate. Tax evasion does not qualify as a predicate crime on the US 130+ list.
Only failure to pay U.S. taxes on the proceeds of a crime, or a mix of criminal and
non-criminal proceeds, is a money laundering crime in the US. A person who just
cheats the government by not paying taxes from legal income cannot be prosecuted
for money laundering.2
Nor does the EU include tax evasion in its definition of money laundering. This
omits a large aspect of international criminal financial behavior. For example, Reuter
and Truman [23] deeply regret that tax evasion is not included in the US money
2 Though tax evasion is not on the 130+ list of predicate crimes under the US Code 1956 (a) (1) A (ii) in
order for the financial transaction of funds derived from specified unlawful activities to count as money
laundering the accused should have undertaken the respective activity with the intention to commit tax
evasion. According to the legislative history of the amendment (134 Cong. Rec. S17367 (daily ed.
November 10, 1988)): “Under this provision any person who conducts a financial transaction that in whole
or in part involves property derived from unlawful activity, intending to engage in conduct that constitutes
a violation of the tax laws, would be guilty of a money laundering offense.”So tax evasion (=in this case
evasion of payment of taxes on criminal profits of unlawful profits or mix of unlawful and lawful profits)
together with fraud and false statements is a basic crime under that provision for money laundering
prosecution (see http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/readingroom/2001ctm/25ctax.htm) (see the interpretation of M.
Busuoic in [30])
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laundering definition. They show that income from tax evasion is by far the largest
part of criminal income (quoted in [21]). It amounts to about 4 to 6% of GDP.
Estimates from Schneider and Enste [25], and Schneider [24] on the development of
the shadow economy indicate that tax evasion has increased over time.
In the following we will leave out tax evasion, then, and instead concentrate on
the two most important predicate crimes: fraud and drugs.
Quantifying predicate crimes
Walker and Unger [44] see fraud as the predicate crime which produces the highest
criminal proceeds. As for tax evasion there are only sporadic estimates of fraud from
individual countries and for particular sorts of fraud (such as credit card fraud, value
added tax fraud). Fraud seems to rise over time at least with respect to identity fraud
and company fraud (see 30, 31). For criticism of the data see Thoumi [29] and the
works of Reuter, who in particular heavily criticizes the interpretation of fraud
survey data [21, 23].
The lack of data makes a serious empirical comparison of fraud impossible at the
time being. However so far there exist no signs that fraud has decreased in previous
years. This means that we can safely exclude this factor in our efforts to determine if
anti-money laundering policy has been successful.
The development of drug cultivation of opium and cocaine is meticulously
monitored by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (see diverse
annual reports). Opium cultivation is watched by satellite, opium fields are zoomed
in with programs like Google Earth, and the average production per square meter or
acre is calculated depending on the quality of the harvest. There are also drug
consumption data from treatment statistics and drug seizure data which allow for the
estimation of other drugs as well, however with less reliability.
As Fig. 2 shows, the manufacturing of cocaine, the drug which today poses the
greatest drug problem for the US population, has not decreased since 1995. A more
favorable result could be reached with regard to the most dangerous drug, opium,
which can be processed into heroin. Opium cultivation has decreased since 2007,
where it was 9,000 metric tons, quite significantly. However, with 7,800 metric tons
production is still higher than its long run average of 5,000 metric tons.
According to the UNODC [41] the production of other drugs, like amphetamines,
ecstasy, marijuana and hashish all have increased since the mid 1980s. In addition,
the quality and purity of some of the softer drugs has increased so much that health
problems (like psychosis from long term hashish consumption) also increased.
Overall, drug production and the proceeds of drugs do not seem to have declined
since the mid 1980s. There was, however, a substitution from hard drugs with softer
drugs production, in particular since 2007. So, if anti-money laundering policy has
had a positive effect on crime, then at its best it has led to a reduction of hard drugs
at the expense of increasingly intense soft drugs.
The proceeds of crime
In the following, we will look mainly at proceeds from drugs since other crime-
related data are largely missing or as shown above, contested. In addition, the
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original crime associated with money laundering was drug trafficking. Did anti-
money laundering policy lead to a decline in the volume of drug production or
consumption, or did it lead to a decrease in profits of the narcotic business?
The volume of drugs produced can be sold at the market price.3 The proceeds of
crime are hence the sales volume times the sales price. Reuter and Truman [23] show
how sensitive drug proceed estimates are to where the drug is sold. Between the
price that the Afghani peasant producer gets and the price that the US consumer
finally pays are thousands of percentages of mark-up along the drug route. Seizures
along this route indicate that there are ‘leakages’, i.e. the drug gets partly sold along
this route. Anthony and Fries [1] follow the cocaine path to market and show that
1 g pure cocaine left the Columbian coca-farm for ten cents and cost $130 US
dollars on American streets in the late 1990s.
In 2005, the UNODC estimated the size of the global illicit drugs market at the
retail level at $322 billion or 1% of world GDP. North America and Europe were
identified as the largest drugs market accounting for 44% and 33% respectively of
the global market. The largest drugs sales were related to cannabis, followed by
cocaine and the opiates (Fig. 1). The UNODC has a good overview over the size and
value of the heroin and cocaine markets. With regard to the cannabis and synthetic
drugs market, more uncertainty exists, as these are harder to detect. A UNODC study
on illicit capital flows resulting from transnational organized crime gives an
overview of the existing estimates and models used in estimating proceeds of crime.
There seem to be indications that the cannabis market today is smaller than estimated
by the model of 2003, while the synthetic drugs market has increased. The value of
the global illicit drug market in 2010 is estimated to lie between $200 and $400
billion [41]. If the value of the drugs market did not change over the last 7 years,
hence remaining at $322 billion then the percentage of drugs in GDP would have
fallen. With this, the anti-money laundering authorities could register some success.
However the range of the estimates given is still too large to conclude even the sign
of the trend in total drugs proceeds.
If we focus on the better researched aspects of the drugs market, the opium/heroin
and the cocaine market, then some interesting results can be seen.
If we multiply the cultivated cocaine with the US inflation adjusted cocaine retail
sale gram price, we find that these ‘proceeds’ of cocaine have not declined4 (see
Fig. 2 below). A reduction in cocaine manufacturing (or an increase in cocaine
seizure) is usually offset by higher cocaine prices, with the result that the proceeds of
cocaine are very stable over time. However, for the other hard drug, opium, cultivation
has decreased over the last 2 years (though it has not gone down over the whole period).
Heroin is produced from opium, and if the relation between opium cultivation and
heroin proceeds stayed similar in the last 2 years to levels over the whole period, then
3 The drugs seized by the authorities have to be deducted if one assumes that authorities destroy the drug
and do not resell it on the market, which is true for some countries, but unfortunately not for others. In the
following we neglect seizures, though there might be an increase of seizures due to a more intense anti
drug policy.
4 This number definitely overestimates the worldwide proceeds of cocaine, since not all cocaine is sold in
the US but perhaps in cheaper location and perhaps in bigger quantities. But under the assumption that
drug prices in other countries stayed on average in a constant relation to the US cocaine price, the trend in
the proceeds of cocaine would still be correct.
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heroin proceeds will have decreased (as did opium cultivation). Compared to the 1990s
this could be viewed as a success of anti-money laundering policy.
There also seems to be substitution from hard drugs to softer drugs, since the total
value of the global drugs market has not decreased.5
Money laundering
If crime did not substantially decline, and if the proceeds of crime did not decline
much and at best slightly in percent of GDP, did money laundering itself decline? Or
do criminals have fewer profits from their drugs sales and other proceeds of crime
due to higher costs of laundering or the increasing confiscation of assets? One
possibility for this would be that criminals afraid of being caught by this new policy
start to build up their own underworld, which can be financed by criminal money
without having to launder it. A black economy paid for by criminal money, with
schools and universities run by criminals for criminals, with criminal food stores,
criminal tailors and with car dealers for criminals. In the following, we will assume
that there is no such (or only a negligible) underworld effect and that the need for
laundering did not decline in the last 30 years.
It is surprising how little effort has been undertaken so far to find out whether
money laundering declined. Estimates of the proceeds of crime and money
laundering are rare (for a survey see 30, 31; at the moment, January 2011, the
UN, the US government and the IMF are busy with this subject and updating this).
However these estimates are also highly contested: Thoumi [29], Reuter and
Greenfield [22], Reuter and Truman [23], Levi and Reuter [21] are some of the most
outspoken critics of measurements done so far.
Notwithstanding all criticism, some efforts have been made to quantify global
money laundering. Prominent among these is the 1998 statement by then-Director of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Michel Camdessus [8], that “2 to 5% of
global [gross domestic product] would probably be a consensus range”. Though
intense internal inquiry within the IMF never could clarify the source of this estimate
5 This is also called the ‘balloon effect’, see R. Seccombe [27], Squeezing the balloon: international drugs










Fig. 1 The value of the global illicit drug market. UNODC [40] World Drugs Report Vol. 1, p.127
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[44], it became a point of reference. So, money laundering is supposed to amount to
about 5% of GDP according to the IMF and the Walker gravity model [42], to more
according to Schneider 2000, [25] and Argentiero et al. [2] and to much less
according to Reuter and Truman [23] who think that measuring is of no use anyway
(for a survey see [30–32]). Most of the studies refer to only one point in time and
require updating (see e.g. approaches by [30, 31, 42, 44]).
One idea would be to take the trend in Suspicious Activity Reports or Unusual
Transaction Reports in order to examine whether money laundering has increased.
More reports indicating more laundering could then either mean that there is more
laundering or that laundering activities have been taken more seriously by the private
sector. This means that more reports should be seen as a positive contribution to
combating laundering. But as Takats [28] warned, more reports could just mean that
the private sector, afraid of being fined, starts reporting more and more thus diluting
information rather than providing additional insight to the authorities. Unger and van
Waarden [38] showed that it is even not clear whether more or less reporting
indicated an improvement of anti-money laundering policy. After the introduction of
the risk-based approach in 2005, US reporting increased dramatically while Dutch
reporting declined drastically (see Fig. 3 below). The reason they give is that the
Dutch authorities have developed the risk-based approach in a consensual way
together with business and have very low fines for not reporting, which are also
rarely executed. Hence the Dutch private sector has an incentive to only provide
‘true’ money laundering cases. So information reported to the FIU gets scarcer but
qualitatively better, while US reporting frequency increases but becomes qualitatively
worse. From this example, we can conclude that it will not be possible to analyze
whether money laundering increased with the help of suspicious activity reports.
If one finds a trend in laundering over time it is almost always country specific.
Italian authors tried to measure the trend in laundering for Italy and Fig. 4 below
shows the different outcomes of studies for Italy. Money laundering either fluctuates
around a trend [9] or increases [2].
Busato et al. [6] estimated money laundering for the US and EU-15 countries (see
Fig. 5 below). They simulate laundering in a dynamic two-sector model, with a legal
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Fig. 2 Potential production and proceeds of heroin and cocaine. UNODC (several years). Data for heroin
proceeds are not corrected for loss during processing. For a more detailed analysis see Unger (2012)
294 B. Unger, J. den Hertog
do in the legal and the criminal sector, accounting for the fact that they can be
sanctioned for the latter. With the help of observable data on the legal economy the
authors can check the forecasting quality of their model for the legal sector and
predict the unobservable criminal sector. As Fig. 5 shows, according to their
findings, money laundering increases in the US steadily from 18.5% to 19.5% of
GDP over time and decreases in Europe only very little from 18.5% to 18% of GDP.
Note that the model specification includes parts of the shadow economy and not only
money laundering according to our definition, thus explaining the high numbers.
To sum up, the increased efforts of anti-money laundering policy were
accompanied by a slight reduction in hard drugs (such as heroin) at the expense of
an increase in softer drugs of higher quality and potency. And it led to almost no
visible decrease in the proceeds of crime. There must hence be still a lot of criminal
money somewhere, but where?
Fig. 4 Money laundering measurements in Italy. Unger [32] from [2, 9]. Schneider and Enste [25] and
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Source: Unger and Van Waarden [38]
Fig. 3 Reporting of suspicious activities in the US and in the Netherlands. Unger and Van Waarden [38]
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New ways of money laundering and some empirical evidence
The changed role of the financial sector for laundering
The major concern of anti-money laundering policy was laundering through the
financial sector. As a consequence, the financial sector became more regulated and
controlled, had to report suspicious transactions, and became increasingly aware of
money laundering issues. Know your customer/CDD-rules make it much more difficult
nowadays for a criminal to bring a suitcase full of cash to a bank than 20 years ago.
Most of the anti-money laundering regulations so far concern the banking sector.
Although some countries still compete for criminal money and might be less strict in
applying the anti-money laundering (AML) laws than others [14, 37], the banking
sector has become less attractive for launderers. At the very least, laundering costs
might have increased and therefore have a deterrence effect for laundering in the
banking sector.
However, financial regulation does not encompass the whole financial sector.
Since the liberalization of capital markets in the 1980s, higher incomes were created
and finance ‘took off’ by becoming a world of its own with six times more financial
assets in relation to GDP than in the 1980s (see [33]). This necessitated a search for
new investments in which to place the large amounts of new liquidity. In the last
30 years many new investments and new markets for these investments have been
created, partly located within traditional banks as ‘shadow banks’ (e.g. a real estate
investment department within a traditional European bank). Some of these new
investment possibilities were largely uncontrolled, like the private equity market and
the derivative market. Only during the latest financial crisis did we hear about
shadow banks and asset constructions, which allowed banks’ financial investment
possibilities to extend far outside their traditional banking business.6 Asset backed
securities and securitization, derivatives and over the counter derivatives, hedge
funds, venture capital and private equity funds, were some of these prominent
6 The traditional bank business consists of providing liquidity and of transforming risks and terms between
savers and investors
































































Source: Busato, Bagella and Argentiero [6]
Fig. 5 Money laundering development in the EU-15 and the US
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financial innovations. They offered large profits and were not (fully) under central
bank supervision and were (largely) out of government control.
Figure 6 below depicts and highlights the sheer magnitude of one of the major
financial innovations in this time period, namely derivatives. Trading in derivatives
markets has expanded significantly more than trading in spot markets. Globally, the
trading volume of derivatives is roughly 66 times higher than world GDP, whereas spot
trading amounts to “only” 8 times world GDP [26]. The largest market for derivatives is
the over-the-counter (OTC) market. OTC derivatives are contracts that are traded (and
privately negotiated) directly between two parties, without going through an exchange or
other intermediary. Products such as swaps, forward rate agreements and exotic options
are almost always traded in this way. The OTC derivative market is largely unregulated
with respect to disclosure of information between the parties, since the OTC market is
made up of banks and other highly sophisticated parties, such as hedge funds. Reporting
of OTC amounts is difficult because trades can occur in private, without activity being
visible on any exchange. According to the Bank for International Settlements, the total
outstanding notional amount is US $ 582 trillion (as of June 2010, see [3], Table 19).
Alternative investments offered a large variety of possibilities for investors to
recuperate large profits, partly with the possibility to stay anonymous. Why should
law abiding citizens also profit from this outstanding possibility to make high profits
without taking the risk of getting caught?
The financial crisis also revealed that criminals made use of the liquidity squeeze that
resulted from banks’ distrust of interbank lending. Criminals introduced additional cash
and herewith helped the dried out banking sector (and themselves). The head of the
UN’s Office on Drugs and Crime, Antonio Maria Costa, generated some headlines in
early 2009 when he made claims about the importance of illicit funds in sustaining
liquidity in the face of the financial crisis (AML-CFT [4]). According to him several
hundred billion US dollars had been introduced into the financial system by the mafia.
The Bank of Italy early in 2010 also made claims regarding increased mafia
involvement in lending as bank loans dried up, based on evidence provided by the
Central Bank’s FIU of a sharp increase in suspicious financial transactions [5]
The global financial crisis has generated political pressures for more regulation of













































Fig. 6 The development of the largely uncontrolled derivative market
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crime—drugs and fraud—has not declined or even increased (see “The Trend in the
Proceeds of Crime”), and if the banking sector becomes more intensely controlled, it
is likely that the proceeds of crime will find new ways of circulating across
countries. The expansion of regulation from banking to other sectors like real estate
and traders of large values illustrates that money so far always found its way by
exploring new sectors which then had yet to be regulated (see “Regulatory Efforts to
Reduce Money Laundering and Crime”). This regulation pattern is to be found in
many regulatory fields where the discovery of previously unknown facts led to an
expansion of regulation. Deregulation follows regulation, both in practice and in
theory (see [16] for an overview of theories). Criminals switch from one sector to
another. Money laundering can take many forms. Al Capone used launderettes for
disguising illegal alcohol revenues during prohibition in the US. Launderettes, a
flourishing cash intensive business in the 1930s, were an ideal location to slip the
money from illegal alcohol sales into the cash register. There are many new forms
and techniques of money laundering which offer increasing possibilities to launder
money outside the financial sector.
Electronic payment forms money laundering
These new forms of laundering include prepaid virtual gold currencies, ATM cards,
mobile phone payments, and Internet-based payment systems (see [20, 45]). Virtual
gold currencies (e.g., e-gold, Goldmoney, e-Bullion, AnonymousGold) are account-
based electronic payment systems whose value is backed by 100%-golden deposits
in a private storage of the system provider who often operates from an offshore
country (e.g., e-gold Ltd., Nevis Corporation). In the case of gold currencies, only
certain weights of gold are booked to the accounts of receivers. While the possession
of gold reserves changes constantly, the gold in the treasury vault remains
untouched. For exchange or purchase of gold currencies, the user opens an account
for a virtual gold currency at a system provider. The identification requirements are
negligible in comparison to opening a bank account and are often limited only to a
request for information such as name, email address and occasionally physical
address to which then a “verification code” is sent (see [45]).
Criminals can purchase legitimate prepaid automated teller machine (ATM) cards
or smart cards, deposit their dirty money onto the card, and then withdraw the
newly-cleaned funds from any ATM anywhere in the world. Mobile phone
payments, an especially popular method for making transactions in the Middle East,
provide money launderers an opportunity to evade AML bodies. In addition,
electronic payment transfers such as Eurobonds [15] eCash or Digital Cash [10, 20]
can conceal the money’s origins and keep owners anonymous even when they reside
in a very traceable environment, the internet. Trade-based money laundering and
laundering through the real estate sector have both become more popular. For these
new forms of laundering, which often take place outside the financial sector, little
empirical work has been done on a larger, global scale.
So far, no empirical estimates of the amounts of electronic money laundering
have been made. Models of how to evaluate it are still missing. More promising
developments in estimating other new forms of laundering will be described in the
next two subsections.
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Trade based money laundering
One of the oldest techniques to circumvent government scrutiny might become
increasingly popular again today: using international trade to move money,
undetected, from one country to another, by means of fake invoicing or falsely
declared merchandise [46].
Launderers can, for example, create fake invoices for high amounts and ship
merchandise of low value or reverse this procedure as a way of concealing ill-gotten
gains. These techniques have recently received attention under the heading of trade
based money laundering. In June 2006, the FATF released the first comprehensive
report on Trade-Based Money Laundering which stated that “The international trade
system is clearly subject to a wide range of risks and vulnerabilities that can be
exploited by criminal organizations and terrorist financiers” [11]. In June 2008 the
FATF published the best practices of Trade-Based Money Laundering.
How can one detect trade based money laundering? Economic analysis of trade
data can help to develop risk indicators for identifying suspicious trading countries,
suspicious merchandise and for determining the scale of trade based money
laundering.
Zdanowicz [46] analyzed monthly data contained in the United States Merchandise
Trade Database. This database is produced by the United States Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Census and is used to determine the United States’ balance of
trade. He identified suspicious merchandise, the share of trade suspect to money
laundering for each country, and the amount of money laundering between the US and
countries on the Al Qaeda watch list. He estimated the money moved out of the US
through overvalued import prices or undervalued export prices to amount to $189
billion in 2006, as opposed to $167 billion in 2004 (see [46], Ch 4.2)
Zdanowicz’s method is valid under the assumption that product prices (and
product weights) are normally distributed and that unusual prices have a criminal
intention and are not, for example, just a booking error by customs. Figure 7 shows a
product, say ketchup, which at an import price of $0.14 lies below the margins of
this country’s usual ketchup prices, which are $0.51 cents and $2.51 cents. All
transactions with a price below the 5% margin or above the 95% margin are
classified as trade-based money laundering. Zdanowicz uses not only country prices,
but also world prices and variance measures to determine unusual transactions.
A still unresolved weakness of the model is that no matter how great the price
fluctuations are, 10% of all transactions are always classified as suspicious (the
upper and lower 5%). If for example the ketchup price fluctuation presented in Fig. 7
is drastically reduced (e.g. because of less trade based money laundering in ketchup),
so that the bell shape becomes narrower, with the new margins lying between $1 and
$2, then 10% of the transactions would still be counted as suspicious. Transactions,
which under the old distribution were classified unsuspicious, would suddenly
become suspicious, though the true reason might simply be attributed to a reduction
in trade-based money laundering and not an increase7
Zdanowicz’s method inspired Unger and Ferwerda [36] to expand it and to apply
it to measuring money laundering in the real estate sector.
7 I owe this point to Joras Ferwerda
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Money laundering in the real estate sector
The real estate sector is a prominent candidate for money laundering, particularly for the
last phase of money laundering, parking the proceeds of crime permanently. The real
estate sector consists of three sub-markets: the business sector (offices, shops, factory
halls etc.), the private housing sector (first and second hand houses and apartments etc.),
and the public sector (government buildings, prisons etc.). Real estate objects can be
used in two ways for criminal purposes. They can be traded in order to hide the origin of
illicit funds in a non-transparent and speculative market, or they can be used as a final
investment, where criminals park their money in business or houses permanently.
Money laundered through these final investments can either be used to create legal
income (e.g. rent) or for doing criminal business (e.g. an ecstasy lab).
In the Netherlands, criminologists have studied the real estate sector very
carefully. For a small open economy, the danger of criminals settling down and
occupying whole streets and districts became a visible reality when several drug
barons were shot in the city of Amsterdam in 2000. Given the importance of the real
estate sector, several studies on criminal behavior in the real estate sector have been
carried out. Most prominent is the study of the Dutch Ministry of Justice’s research
center WODC, by Ferwerda et al. [12], which gives a good overview of maleficent
behavior in the Dutch real estate sector, and the Financial Expertise Center (FEC)
report of [13] on money laundering techniques.
Unger and Ferwerda [36] used these findings about money laundering techniques
in real estate and the behavior of criminals in the real estate sector and combined this
information with economic data on unusual developments of economic variables.
First, following Zdanowicz’s idea of using unusual prices for identifying
suspicious objects, Unger and Ferwerda used studies on unusual housing price
movements. However, one cannot separate purely speculative price movements-
price increases from splitting of apartments or office spaces-from criminal price
movements. Since speculation is inherent in this market and not necessarily illegal,
the authors had to combine this information with other unusual criteria in order to
filter out the criminal objects.
From the existing literature on criminal behavior and money laundering
techniques in the real estate sector, Unger and Ferwerda derived 25 characteristics
Source: Unger [32]
Fig. 7 Unusual product price for identifying trade based money laundering
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of an object which were classified as ‘unusual.’ These were, for example, objects
that somebody sold to herself; or houses without a mortgage though interest rates on
mortgage are tax deductable in the Netherlands; foreign ownership; foreign financed
constructions; a home value which did not correspond to the income of the person; a
newly established company which closed down very quickly again; etc.
Unger and Ferwerda had access to data from the Housing Registering Office
(Kadaster), the Chamber of Commerce and the Tax Authority (Belastingdienst), in order
to identify objects with unusual characteristics in two Dutch cities, Utrecht and
Maastricht. Data availability forced the authors to reduce the study to 17 measurable
characteristics. They then looked how many of these 17 unusual characteristics each
object had. For each characteristic they gave a ‘red flag’. The more ‘red flags’ an object
received, the more unusual it was considered. One object received 9 flags, all other
objects got less, and no object received all 17 flags. Unger and Ferwerda finally arrived at
a list of 200 objects, which they passed on to criminologists for further analysis. The only
information that the criminologists were given was that this list of 200 objects contained
50 objects that were not unusual and 150, which were unusual according to the economic
data analysis. The criminologists were not told which objects were unusual, i.e. contained
how many ‘red flags’ in order to treat all objects with equal attention.
As a second step (Part Two) the criminologists combined the object numbers with
Housing Registering Office data in order to find out which persons stood behind
these 200 objects. They then used criminological data to check whether the unusual
objects belonged to persons with criminal records. For this they had access to
Ministry of Justice and police data. They also checked whether there were suspect
persons, which the top down indicator approach had missed. In Part Three Unger
and Ferwerda [36] combined the economic and criminological experiences and
analyzed which characteristics of an object (unusual purchasing sum, foreign
ownership, no mortgage, etc.) are useful indicators for identifying conspicuous
objects and their owners’ suspect of money laundering.
The identified money laundering objects times the housing price of the objects gives
the amount of money laundered in the real estate sector. If one calculates the volume
identified (150 objects) with the average Dutch housing price of 200,000 Euros, then the
identified money laundering is small (30 million Euros) compared to the expected
volume of money laundered in this sector in the Netherlands (3–6 billion Euros) [30,
31]. However, the study comprises only two middle sized Dutch cities and not the
whole Netherlands. In addition, the method can only identify objects which left a
paper trail. Laundering constructions without a paper trail (e.g. buying a house with a
large amount of cash money and using the notary public as a facilitator, and registering
at a modestly higher or lower housing price in the books, would stay unnoticed).
Conclusions
Both crime and laundering of the proceeds of crime seem to be very flexible. A
prodigious lack of data makes it difficult to come to decisive conclusions. But the paper
showed that many indicators point at the fact that substitution seems to be the major
effect of anti-drug and anti-money laundering policy. Hard drugs (such as heroin) get
substituted by softer drugs, which increase in intensity (marijuana) while synthetic drugs
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replace traditional drugs.Money laundering switches from the traditional banking sector
to the less regulated derivative market and to other sectors. Among these, electronic
payments such as buying gold via the internet or by loadable phone cards are increasing.
Also, money laundering by fake invoicing of exports and imports and other forms of
trade based money laundering offer a substitute for launderers. The real estate sector is
another lucrative way for launderers to hide their illicit gotten proceeds and expand their
criminal business. Measurement and detection of money laundering face new challenges
with these new ways of laundering. The method proposed in this paper uses unusual
movements of economic variables in combination with other characteristics of a person,
transaction or an object in order to identify money laundering in a sector. Using
econometric and statistical logit and probit analysis, one can also calculate the
probability with which a certain object is a money laundering object. With this, the
method proposed can be an important tool for the executive. But for measuring
substitution effects between sectors, the amount of laundering per sector must be arrived
at using long term series, which will not be available for some timeMoney waiting to be
laundered, like water, will always find its way, but the way will become more costly and
cumbersome. Eradicating money laundering altogether, like eradicating crime, is
impossible since the costs of establishing a zero crime or zero laundering system would
be far too high in a democracy. Only dictatorships have reached such a result so far.
However, although we do not call for zero money laundering, we would definitely be
happy if we could better understand the process from combined research efforts, and to
find out whether money laundering increases or declines after all.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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